Behavioral Game Theory

Prof. Dr. Ralph-C. Bayer




Here is the proposed syllabus of a course in Behavioural Game The-

ory. The course.s main aim is to familiarise graduate students with

modern behavioural extensions to standard game theory. A prerequi-

sites is the knowledge of undergraduate-level game theory and some

standard mathematics for economists. A deeper knowledge of game

theory and some knowledge of experimental economics are desirable

but not necessarily required.

The syllabus is to be understood as the maximum content that

could be taught. It consists of 20 two-hour lectures. All the compo-

nents have been taught in various incarnations of the postgraduate

course .Behavioural Game Theory and Experiments. at the Univer-

sity of Adelaide .however never together in one year. A subset of the

full program could be chosen, depending on students prior knowledge

from existing courses and the desired number of teaching hours.

This course is more a course in game theory than in experimental

or behavioural economics. While seminal experimental .ndings will

be used to motivate theoretical concepts, the emphasis is on the the-

ory. Particular emphasis will be given to the process of extending

standard game theory. This will help interested students to improve

their own modelling skills (using behavioural or standard game-theory


There is no textbook for this course. The work is based on orig-

inal articles. The articles are supplemented by lecture notes, which

are designed to break down the often di¢ cult material to a manage-

able level for graduate students. The preferred teaching language is

English; Geman is possible though.

1 Introduction

1.1 Some thoughts on the methodology of Economics

.1 Lecture

1.2 Behavioural implications of standard assumptions

.1 Lecture

2 Part I: Non-Standard Preferences

2.1 Social preferences (Fehr/Schmidt, Bolton/Ockenfels,

Charness/Rabin) .3 Lectures

2.2 Payo¤-relevant beliefs (Geanakopolos/Pearce/Stachetti,

Rabin, Dufwenberg/Kirchsteiger, Falk/Fischbacher)

.3 Lectures

2.3 History-dependent concerns for others (Cox/Friedman/Gjerstad)

.1 Lecture

2.4 Reference-dependent preferences (Kahneman/Tversky,

Rabin/Koszegi) .2 Lectures

3 Part II: Bounded Rationality

3.1 Noisy EquilibriumConcepts (Radner,McKelvey/Palfrey)

.2 Lectures

3.2 Cognitive Hierarchy Models of Bounded Rational-

ity (Stahl/Wilson, Goeree/Holt) .2 Lectures

4 Part III: Learning

4.1 Reinforcement Learning (Erev/Roth) .1 Lecture

4.2 Experience weighted attraction learning (Camerer/Ho-

Teck) .1 Lecture

4.3 Learning direction Theory (Selten) .1 Lecture

4.4 Belief learning and its extensions (Fudenberg/Levine,

Sarin/Varhid, Bayer/Wu) .2 Lectures

General Data

  • Abbreviation
  • Semester
    winter semester 15/16
  • Target Groups
    WiSo doctoral study program
  • Course Type
  • Course Language
  • Departments
    Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences

Place and Time

  • Place
    Von Melle Park 9 Raum A316
  • Time
    from 04/11/2015 weekly Wednesdays to 25/11/2015 from 12:00 to 16:00
    except Mittwoch 11.11.2015
  • Place
    Von Melle Park 9 Raum A215
  • Time
    from 05/11/2015 weekly Thursdays to 05/11/2015 from 09:00 to 13:00
  • Place
    Von Melle Park 9 Raum A510
  • Time
    from 06/11/2015 to 06/11/2015 from 09:00 to 13:00
  • Place
    Von Melle Park 9 Raum A507
  • Time
    from 19/11/2015 to 19/11/2015 from 09:00 to 13:00
  • Place
    Von Melle Park 9 Raum B 537
  • Time
    from 26/11/2015 to 26/11/2015 from 09:00 to 13:00

Recognition Modalities

  • Number of Semester Hours
  • Amount of Credit Points
  • Creditable as
    • WiSo doctoral program: WiSo theories for Economics
    • WiSo doctoral program: WiSo theories for Social Economics
    • WiSo doctoral program: WiSo theories for Social Siences

Registration Modalities

  • Type of Place Allocation
    Manual Place Allocation (after the registration deadline)
  • Information about Registration
  • Max. Number of Participants