Behavioral Game Theory
Prof. Dr. Ralph-C. BayerVeranstaltung
Beschreibung
Abstract
Here is the proposed syllabus of a course in Behavioural Game The-
ory. The course.s main aim is to familiarise graduate students with
modern behavioural extensions to standard game theory. A prerequi-
sites is the knowledge of undergraduate-level game theory and some
standard mathematics for economists. A deeper knowledge of game
theory and some knowledge of experimental economics are desirable
but not necessarily required.
The syllabus is to be understood as the maximum content that
could be taught. It consists of 20 two-hour lectures. All the compo-
nents have been taught in various incarnations of the postgraduate
course .Behavioural Game Theory and Experiments. at the Univer-
sity of Adelaide .however never together in one year. A subset of the
full program could be chosen, depending on students prior knowledge
from existing courses and the desired number of teaching hours.
This course is more a course in game theory than in experimental
or behavioural economics. While seminal experimental .ndings will
be used to motivate theoretical concepts, the emphasis is on the the-
ory. Particular emphasis will be given to the process of extending
standard game theory. This will help interested students to improve
their own modelling skills (using behavioural or standard game-theory
tools).
There is no textbook for this course. The work is based on orig-
inal articles. The articles are supplemented by lecture notes, which
are designed to break down the often di¢ cult material to a manage-
able level for graduate students. The preferred teaching language is
English; Geman is possible though.
1 Introduction
1.1 Some thoughts on the methodology of Economics
.1 Lecture
1.2 Behavioural implications of standard assumptions
.1 Lecture
2 Part I: Non-Standard Preferences
2.1 Social preferences (Fehr/Schmidt, Bolton/Ockenfels,
Charness/Rabin) .3 Lectures
2.2 Payo¤-relevant beliefs (Geanakopolos/Pearce/Stachetti,
Rabin, Dufwenberg/Kirchsteiger, Falk/Fischbacher)
.3 Lectures
2.3 History-dependent concerns for others (Cox/Friedman/Gjerstad)
.1 Lecture
2.4 Reference-dependent preferences (Kahneman/Tversky,
Rabin/Koszegi) .2 Lectures
3 Part II: Bounded Rationality
3.1 Noisy EquilibriumConcepts (Radner,McKelvey/Palfrey)
.2 Lectures
3.2 Cognitive Hierarchy Models of Bounded Rational-
ity (Stahl/Wilson, Goeree/Holt) .2 Lectures
4 Part III: Learning
4.1 Reinforcement Learning (Erev/Roth) .1 Lecture
4.2 Experience weighted attraction learning (Camerer/Ho-
Teck) .1 Lecture
4.3 Learning direction Theory (Selten) .1 Lecture
4.4 Belief learning and its extensions (Fudenberg/Levine,
Sarin/Varhid, Bayer/Wu) .2 Lectures
Allgemeine Angaben
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Kurzbezeichnung20-201.26
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SemesterWintersemester 15/16
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ZielgruppenWiSo Promotionsstudiengang
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VeranstaltungsartSeminar
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VeranstaltungsspracheEnglisch
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EinrichtungenFakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
Ort und Zeit
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OrtVon Melle Park 9 Raum A316
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Zeitvom 04.11.2015 wöchentlich mittwochs bis 25.11.2015 von 12:00 bis 16:00außer Mittwoch 11.11.2015
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OrtVon Melle Park 9 Raum A215
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Zeitvom 05.11.2015 wöchentlich donnerstags bis 05.11.2015 von 09:00 bis 13:00
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OrtVon Melle Park 9 Raum A510
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Zeitvom 06.11.2015 bis 06.11.2015 von 09:00 bis 13:00
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OrtVon Melle Park 9 Raum A507
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Zeitvom 19.11.2015 bis 19.11.2015 von 09:00 bis 13:00
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OrtVon Melle Park 9 Raum B 537
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Zeitvom 26.11.2015 bis 26.11.2015 von 09:00 bis 13:00
Anrechnungsmodalitäten
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Anzahl SWS2
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Anzahl Leistungspunkte4
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Anrechenbar als
- WiSo Promotionsstudiengang: WiSo Theorien für Sozialwissenschaften
- WiSo Promotionsstudiengang: WiSo Theorien für Sozialökonomie
- WiSo Promotionsstudiengang: WiSo Theorien für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Anmeldemodalitäten
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Art der PlatzvergabeManuelle Platzvergabe (nach Ende der Anmeldefrist)
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Anmeldeinformation–
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Max. Anzahl Teilnehmer20